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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS: 1970-1971 *
JERROLD G. VAN CISEt

Once more, the Supreme Court has handed down only five significant
antitrust rulings during the term of the Court which recently concluded.
While many appeals raising trade regulation issues were called .to the
attention of the Court, few were chosen as worthy of review. In their
reluctance to impose their views upon the lower courts, the Justices seem
to have taken as their guide the admonition of judge Learned Hand to
the effect that every court should begin "I beseech ye in the bowels of
Christ, think that ye may be mistaken";' and they have generally left
intact the judgments below.
Once more, however, the Supreme Court in these five decisions-as
in those of the preceding term-has nevertheless revealed a conviction
that, when it does rule, it should condemn private restraint and commend
judicial restraint. In three of its cases, it decided adversely to the defendants. In two, it withheld relief from the complainants.
SUBSTANTIVE RULINGS

In two decisions during the 1970 Term, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its intention aggressively to apply the antitrust laws to conduct
believed to be prohibited by these statutes. In one case, the Court reversed
the dismissal by a federal district court of an action brought by the
Government challenging the validity of a corporate merger. In another,
the Court overturned the dismissal by the lower courts of a private action
to recover treble damages from a labor union.
United States v. GreaterBuffalo Press, Inc.2 dealt with the acquisition by Greater Buffalo Press of all the stock of International Color
Printing Company. Buffalo printed color comic supplements for and
sold them to newspapers, while International printed them only for King
Features Syndicate, a division of the Hearst Corporation. A civil action
was brought by the Government charging that the acquisition by Buffalo
* This article will be distributed by the Practising Law Institute as the 1970-1971
Supplement to the author's book, Undertaking the Antitrust Laws (2d ed. 1970).
t Partner: Cahill, Gordon, Sonnett, Reindel & Ohl, New York City. Member:
New York and District of Columbia Bars. Chairman, Antitrust Section: American
Bar Association (1960-61).
1. L. HAND, Morals in Public Life, in ThE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 229 (3d ed. 1960),
quoting Oliver Cromwell's letter to the Scots before the Battle of Dunbar (1650).
2. 402 U.S. 549 (1971).
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of the stock of International violated § 7 of the Clayton Act.3 There
were supplementary allegations, involving Hearst, of a violation of § 1
of the Sherman Act;4 but these were settled by a consent decree. The
complaint directed against Buffalo, after trial, was dismissed by the
district court.' In the course of the trial it had been shown that International had sold its stock to Buffalo, even though its profits were increasing, because it believed this alternative to be more attractive than
proceeding to raise capital for necessary modernization and expansion.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed. Initially,
the Court found that Buffalo and International were competitors in the
business of printing and selling color comic supplements:
As we read the record, the printing of color comic supplements and their sale are- component parts of the color comic
supplement printing business. One firm or company may both
print and sell; another may print yet sell through a third
organization, as does International through King. The "area
of effective competition," Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293, 299-300 n. 5, comprises the business of Greater
Buffalo, International, and King. There may be submarkets
within this broad market for antitrust purposes (Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294? 325), but, as we said in
United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank, 399 U.S. 350,
360, "submarkets are not a basis for the disregard of a broader
line of commerce that has economic significance." 6
Second, the Court found that the acquisition by Buffalo of the
stock of International substantially increased concentration and restrained
competition in their common area of effective competition:
Prior to the acquisition, King put pressure on International
to construct a southern plant to meet Greater Buffalo's proposed
expansion there. Prior to the acquisition King also induced
International to cut its prices to meet competition and actually
transferred a few contracts from International to Greater Buffalo
because of prices.
Those practices ceased after the acquisition. Greater Buffalo
acquired control of about 75% of independent color comic supplement printing, leaving King no reliable alternative supply.
3. 15 U.S.C.§ 18 (1970).

4. 15 U.S.C.§ 1 (1970).

1970 Trade Cas. 88, 727 (W.D.N.Y.).
6. 402 U.S. at 552-53.
5.
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Greater Buffalo and International who had been competitors
ceased to be such.7
The Court then held that the acquisition could not be justified by
the "failing company" exception to § 7 of the Clayton Act:
That test is met only if two requirements are satisfied:
(1) that the resources of International were "so depleted and
the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the grave
probability of a business failure .

.

.

."

InternationalShoe Co.

v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 280 U.S. 291, 302, and (2) that
there was no other prospective purchaser for it. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138.
* King had not threatened to invoke, nor had it invoked, the six-month cancellation provision in the contract. Its
expansion plans were being actively pursued and it continued
to pay dividends to its owners. Indeed in the year of the sale it
had shown a substantial increase in profits.
Moreover, only King and Greater Buffalo were considered
as prospective purchasers; the numerous other smaller color
comic supplement printers were never even approached.8
In conclusion, the Court held that the passage of time should not bar
divestiture. The nature of the decree to be entered, however, was left by
a majority of the Court to the district court.
Ramsey v. United Mine Workers' involved an action brought by
petitioner coal mine operators under the Sherman Act alleging that
respondent union had conspired with major coal producers to impose the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, entered into between the
union and these major producers, upon all coal mine operators, with
knowledge that smaller producers (unable to operate profitably under
these provisions) would be driven out of business. Relief in the form of
treble damages was sought. The district court dismissed the action ' on
the ground that "clear proof" was lacking that such a conspiracy had
been entered into; and this dismissal was affirmed by an equally divided
court of appeals." The Supreme Court reversed.'
7. Id. at 554-55.
8. Id. at 555-56.
9. 401 U.S. 302 (1971).
10. 265 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).

11. 416 F2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969).
12. Mr. Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Black,
Harlan and Marshall joined.
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The Court conceded that, under § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 3
the authority of officers, members and agents to commit acts on behalf of
a labor union must be established by "clear proof"; but it ruled that under
the Sherman Act a mere preponderance of the evidence is all that need
be shown to prove an unlawful conspiracy:
In our view, § 6 requires clear and convincing evidence
only as to the Union's authorization, participation in, or ratification of the acts allegedly performed on its behalf. Nor do we
discern any basis for our fashioning a new standard of proof
applicable in antitrust actions against labor unions. Accordingly,
the District Court erred in requiring petitioners' compliance
with the standard of § 6 in proving other elements of their
treble-damage case against the Union.'"
The Court then held that although a labor union may agree upon
terms in a collective bargaining agreement with a multi-employer unit
and seek unilaterally to impose those same terms upon other employers,
it may not agree with the multi-employer unit to do so:
The Court made it unmistakably clear in Allen Bradley Co. v.
Union, 325 U.S. 797, 811 (1945), that unilateral conduct by
a union of the type protected by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts does not violate the Sherman Act even though it
may also restrain trade. . . . We adhere to this view. But . . .
"[a] business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such participation is a violation of the Act." Id.,
at 811. Hence we also adhere to the decision in Pennington:
"[T]he relevant labor and antitrust policies compel us to conclude that the alleged agreement between UMW and the large
operators to secure uniform labor standards throughout the
industry, if proved, was not exempt from the antitrust laws."
381 U.S., at 669. Where a union, by agreement with one set of
employers, insists on maintaining in other bargaining units
specified wage standards ruinous to the business of those
employers, it is liable under the antitrust laws for the damages
caused by its agreed-upon conduct."
6
The first of these holdings, like last year's Phillipsburg"
decision,

13. 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1970).
14. 401 U.S. at 311.
15. Id. at 313.
16. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
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reveals that implied judicial exemptions will not lightly be read into the
antitrust laws by the present Supreme Court. The second, much in the
manner spelled out in the ICC7 ruling of the past term, suggests that
express legislative immunity from these laws will not readily be expanded
beyond the language, strictly construed, of the statutes. The thrust of the
decisions of the "Burger Court," as well as those of the "Warren Court,"
seems to indicate that prohibited restraints of trade which seek to escape
through the eye of the antitrust needle are apt to be impaled on its point.
PROCEDURAL RULINGS

The other decisions of the Supreme Court during the 1970 Term
demonstrated the extent to which the present majority of the Justices
seek to insure that due process is accorded to the parties both in any
finding of antitrust violation and in any resulting grant of judicial relief.
One of these decisions upheld, by a narrow margin, the dismissal of an
action brought by the Government. The others related to relief sought
by private parties.
In United States v. Armour & Co., 8 the Government had previously appealed to the Supreme Court to prevent General Host, a company engaged in the manufacture and sale of food products, from
acquiring ownership of a majority of the stock of Armour & Company,
a meatpacker. A consent decree entered in 1920 had enjoined Armour
from engaging directly or indirectly in the food business, and this decree
was claimed by the Government to forbid any other company engaged
in such business from being affiliated through stock ownership in Armour.
While the appeal was pending, General Host sold its Armour stock to
Greyhound Company, a regulated motor carrier which likewise was
engaged in the food business. The appeal was then dismissed as moot by
the Supreme Court, 9 and the Government thereupon filed a petition
seeking similar relief against Greyhound. The district court held, as it
had when General Host's ownership of Armour stock was at issue, that
the prohibition of the consent decree which enjoined Armour from
acquiring a controlling interest in a food company did not proscribe
another food company from acquiring such an interest in Armour.2" The
Supreme Court, in a four-to-three opinion, 2 affirmed the lower court's
ruling.
17. United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491 (1970).
18. 402 U.S. 673 (1971).
19. 398 U.S. 268 (1970).
20. United States v. Swift & Co., No. 58C613 (N.D. Ill., June 30, 1970).
21. Justices Douglas, Brennan and White dissented, and Justices Black and
Blackmun did not participate.
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At the outset, the Court explained that it was not upholding the
legality of the acquisition. It pointed out, for example, that it was not
ruling that the Government could not bar the transaction either by an
action under § 7 of the Clayton Act or by a proceeding to seek modification of the decree:
It [the Government] took neither of those steps, but, rather,
sought to enjoin the acquisition under the decree as originally
written. Thus the case presents only the narrow question
whether ownership of a majority of stock in Armour by a
company that engages in business forbidden to Armour by the
decree, in itself and without any evidentiary showing as to the
consequences, violates the prohibition against Armour "directly
or indirectly

.

.

engaging in or carrying on" that forbidden

business.22
The majority opinion
contending that Greyhound
in active concert with such
"take over" of its company.

next noted that the Government was not
was either a party to the decree or someone
a party. Armour was in fact opposed to the
Rather:

The contention is that the acquisition violates the decree
since it causes Armour to be engaged in activities prohibited
by the decree. The claim is that Greyhound is engaged in
businesses that the decree prohibits Armour from being engaged
in and the decree's purported purpose of separating the meatpackers from the retail food business is thus circumvented.2"
The Court proceeded to analyze the decree and concluded that none
of its provisions as presently written extended to the transaction at issue:
[T]here is no prohibition against [Armour] selling any
interest to a grocery firm, or more generally against ertering
into an ownership relationship with such a firm. If the parties
had agreed to such a prohibition, they could have chosen language that would have established the sort of prohibition that
the Government now seeks.24
The Court therefore held that the consent decree was to be interpreted as written, and was not to be extended beyond its terms on the
basis of an alleged intent of one of the parties:
22. 402 U.S. at 675.
23. Id. at 677.
24. Id. at 679 (footnote omitted).
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Thus the decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather
the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and
the resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the. bargaining power and
skill to achieve. For these reasons, the scope of a consent decree
must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference
to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it.
Because the defendant has, by the decree, waived his right to
litigate the issues raised, a right guaranteed to him by the Due
Process Clause, the conditions upon which he has given that
waiver must be respected, and the instrument must be construed
as it is written, and not as it might have been written had the
plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theories in
litigation. 25
In Bartlett v. United States, 2 the Government challenged a merger
of Atlantic Richfield Company and Sinclair Oil Corporation under § 7 of
the Clayton Act. A year and a half thereafter, a proposed settlement,
allegedly requiring one of the largest divestitures to date in the history of
the antitrust laws, was embodied in a proposed consent judgment which
was to be entered unless the Department of Justice withdrew its consent
thereto prior to the expiration of a thirty-day waiting period. At 3:00
p.m. on the final day of the waiting period, a motion to intervene was
filed by Richard F. Bartlett, pro se, opposing the divestiture. This application to intervene was denied by the district court as both defective in
form and manifestly late.2 7 In addition, the lower court ruled that:
Wholly apart from these considerations, *Mr. Bartlett's
claim is based upon speculation as to the undesirability of the
ultimate purchaser under the proposed divestiture order. The
fear is unfounded because in all probability neither the Department of Justice nor this Court would approve as a purchaser a
person who will not be a sufficiently strong and viable competitor to succeed Sinclair in its marketing operations in the
geographic area in question. Mr. Bartlett's concern is thus premature, since the actual divestiture must first be approved by
the Department of Justice or the Court under the terms of the
decree, and Mr. Bartlett may at that time present his views by
appropriate procedures.28
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 681-82 (footnote omitted).
401 U.S. 986 (1971).
1971 Trade Cas. 89, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Id. at 89, 882.
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On appeal, this judgment of dismissal was affirmed, per curiam, by
the Supreme Court.2 9
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,"0 HRI had
sued Zenith for patent infringement, and Zenith counterclaimed for
damages alleging violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts by HRI.
On a previous appeal, the Supreme Court had held that Zenith was
entitled to recover damages (found by the district court to be $6,297,371)
arising from HRI's participation in a Canadian patent pool;1 but, on
remand, the court of appeals had upheld certain defenses to such a recovery
based upon the statute of limitations and a prior release given to coconspirators." On appeal the second time, the Supreme Court reversed."3
First, the Court held that the statute of limitations was tolled during
the pendency of a prior suit brought by the Government under the antitrust laws against participants in the Canadian patent pool. This was so
despite the fact that the suit had failed to name HRI either as a defendant
or as a co-conspirator:
We find no indication in the legislative history of § 16(b)
that Congress intended it to toll the statute of limitations only
against parties defendant in the Government action. .

.

. We

see nothing destructive of Congress' purpose in holding that
§ 16(b) tolls the statute of limitations against all participants
in a conspiracy which is the object of a Government suit,
whether or not they are named as defendants or conspirators
therein; indeed, to so hold materially furthers congressional
policy by permitting private litigants to await the outcome of
Government suits and use the benefits accruing therefrom. 4
Next, the Court decided that damages may be recovered by Zenith
for acts occurring prior to the statutory period of limitations if, at this
prior time, those damages were speculative or incapable of proof:
In antitrust and treble-damage actions, refusal to award
future profits as too speculative is equivalent to holding that
no cause of action has yet accrued for any but those damages
already suffered. In these instances, the cause of action for future
damages, if they ever occur, will accrue only on the date they
29. Mr. Justice Douglas was of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be
noted and the case set for oral argument. 401 U.S. at 986.
30. 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
31. 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
32. 418 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1969).
33. Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred.
34. 401 U.S. at 335-36.
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are suffered; thereafter the plaintiff may sue to recover them at
any time within four years from the date they were inflicted.
[citations omitted] Otherwise future damages that could not
be proved within four years of the conduct from which they
flowed would be forever incapable of recovery, contrary to the
congressional purpose that private actions serve "as a bulwark
of antitrust enforcement," [citation omitted] and that the
antitrust laws fully "protect the victims of the forbidden
practices as well as the public," [citation omitted] ."
Finally, the Court rejected the defense that a prior release given to
co-conspirators had released HRI, holding that the signatory parties had
not intended to release it:
The straightforward rule is that a party releases only
those other parties whom he intends to release.
Of course . . . a plaintiff who has recovered any item

of damage from one co-conspirator may not again recover the
same item from another conspirator; the law, that is, does not
permit a plaintiff to recover double payment. [citation
omitted] However, the record below indicates that a defense
of payment could not here be sustained. ..

,

The first two rulings, like last year's Armour decision, serve notice
upon public and private petitioners that "short cuts" to justice are not
favored by the present Supreme Court. In both instances proceedings
more appropriate to the orderly administration of the law were available
to the losing parties. In the third, however, as in the Union Oil"' ruling
of the previous term, the Court demonstrated that, once a party has
properly presented and proven antitrust allegations, "legalistic" defenses
to the award of relief are similarly disfavored. In short, a single
standard of judicial due process is to be applied, with equal justice, to
plaintiffs and to defendants.
INFORMATIVE INTERVIEW
The secret of being a bore is said to be "to tell everything." This
vice has not been reflected in the relatively few decisions of the last two
terms of the Supreme Court. However, a reticent, yet revealing, press
35. Id. at 339-40.
36. Id. at 348.
37. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 396 U.S. 13 (1969).
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interview with the Chief Justice 8 has helpfully confirmed the spirit of
judicial self-restraint which has seemed to underlie these rulings. According to Chief Justice Burger:
[C]hanges in the law made by judicial decisions ought
to be approached with considerable caution. It was never contemplated in our system that judges would make drastic changes
by judicial decision. That is what the legislative function and
the rule making function is all about.
In my conception of it, the primary role of the Court is to
decide cases."
The Chief Justice emphasized that, on the one hand, the duty of the
Court should be to proceed promptly and expeditiously to dispose of the
specific cases on its docket:
Inherently, the Supreme Court function is one in which
nothing ought to happen very rapidly except the disposition
of specific cases. In the evolution of legal doctrine, legal principle
can't be sound if its growth is too fast.
Where we need speed is in the processing of the work of
the courts. It is there that we find both failure and challenge.4"
On the other hand, he stressed that this disposition of its case load
should be consistent with insuring quality and clarity in its resultant
rulings:
I would say the greatest challenge is to try to keep up with
the volume of work and maintain the kind of quality that ought
to come from this Court. That is the biggest single challenge I
can see. A lighthouse isn't much use to seafaring travelers if
the lights are dim and unclear. The Court needs time to produce
clarity in its holdings."
Therefore, in his opinion it follows that:
Young people who decide to go into the law primarily
on the theory that they can change the world by litigation in the
courts I think may be in for some disappointments. It is not
the right way to make the decision to go into the law, and that
is not the route by which basic changes in a country like ours
38.
39.
40.
41.

N.Y. Times, July 4, 1971, § 1, at 20, col. 1.
Id.
Id. at col. 8.
Id. at cols. 7-8.
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should be made. That is a legislative and policy process, part of
the political process."'
In short, the Chief Justice would appear to agree with Daniel
Webster that in the courtroom, as elsewhere, "Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint."43
CONCLUSION

The American businessman, traditionally unhappy with antitrust
uncertainties, has long sought "[t]he clear and written law, the deeptrod footmarks of ancient custom .

.

.

to keep him in the road" of

antitrust compliance. Such a businessman should not lightly assume from
this analysis that clarity in antitrust law is now around the comer. But
he may at least take comfort that, if he should be challenged when
speeding to the marketplace, the courts will not automatically accept as
conclusive a charge that he has violated the antitrust traffic laws. For
the promise of the past two terms of the Supreme Court is that the
continuing vigor of antitrust enforcement will, at least more frequently
than in the past," be tempered with the procedural mercy of judicial due
process.
This promise of even-handed antitrust enforcement by the Supreme
Court, however, apparently will not apply to unilateral trade restraints
imposed by labor. Today, newspaper unions-and not a John D. Rockefeller--drive weaker competitors to the wall and create local monopolies;
steel unions-and not a J. P. Morgan-force industry-wide price increases upon the nation; and transportation unions-not a Commodore
Vanderbilt-bring commerce to a standstill with little justification other
than "Hain't I got the power?" But the Supreme Court has reaffimed
in United Mine Workers that, so long as these trade restraints are
dictated to--without the cooperation of-industry, they are "congressionally permitted union activities. '' .
Were Adam Smith currently writing on trade restraints, he would
not today be able easily to dismiss the restrictive role of labor on the
rationale that "his voice is little heard and less regarded."4 Combinations
of labor, as well as combinations of capital, are essential in our modern
42. Id. at col. 6.
43. Speech at the Charleston Bar Dinner, May 10, 1847.
44. See, e.g., Utah Pub. Serv. Comnm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S.
464 (1969).
45. 401 U.S.at 313.
46. A. SmITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIoNs 149 (E. Cannan ed. 1937).

98
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economy. But is it not timely for spokesmen representing the consumer
to petition Congress to provide that such combinations, whether of labor
or of capital, are equally to be held accountable in treble damages and
otherwise for inflationary restraints which pick the pocket of the public?
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